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REPUTATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The positive impact of sustainability on reputation has been assumed but not sufficiently 
examined. This study probes the veracity of these claims by applying legitimacy and signaling 
perspectives to examine whether sustainability performance and assurance contribute to 
corporate reputation. We find superior sustainability performance has a positive association with 
sustainability reputation. Companies with better performance are also more likely to obtain 
external assurance of their sustainability disclosure, but assurance does not directly affect 
reputation. Assurance appears to be a managerial tool associated with the congruence of internal 
processes rather than a differentiating signal to external stakeholders. 
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SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE AND ASSURANCE: INFLUENCE ON 
REPUTATION 
Introduction  
 
 Sustainability has become an important issue for businesses worldwide. The definition of 
sustainability has evolved over the past decade and now tends to include social, environmental, 
governance, and economic components (e.g., Epstein and Roy, 2003; Pfeffer, 2010; Salzmann et 
al., 2005). This more comprehensive view incorporates the impact of organizations on the 
physical and the social environment and acknowledges their influence on natural and human 
resources (Pfeffer, 2010). In a 2011 survey of 4,000 managers in 113 countries by the MIT Sloan 
Management Review and the Boston Consulting Group, 67 percent claimed that sustainability is 
“key to competitive success” (Economist, 2012, p. 76). According to Lubin and Esty (2010), 
sustainability is a megatrend that “will touch every function, every business line, every 
employee” (p. 9). It influences product innovation (Nidumolu et al., 2009), strategic planning 
(Epstein and Roy, 2003), and marketing strategies (Sheth et al., 2011). Additionally, how 
sustainability-focused activities relate to strategic outcomes, specifically reputation, is of interest 
(Johnson et al., 2003; Searcy, 2012).  
Some believe that sustainability efforts can enhance corporate reputation. Forty-one 
percent of the senior executives interviewed for KPMG’s 2011 global survey cited the desire to 
enhance reputation as a main driver behind sustainability efforts (KPMG, 2011). According to 
Fombrun’s (1996, p. 37) widely cited definition, reputation is a social construct that is based on 
the perceptions of stakeholders. External stakeholders are influenced by corporate reputation 
when they choose products, jobs, and make investment decisions (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
Thus, it is an important organizational asset that must be proactively managed (Gibson et al., 
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2006). As noted by Kuruppu and Milne (2010), much of the existing social and environmental 
accounting literature carries an underlying untested assumption that sustainability initiatives 
produce legitimating effects, but little is known about the actual influence of such initiatives on 
reputation.  
Sustainability disclosure is one of the more commonly used approaches to convey a 
firm’s commitment to sustainability. With the growth of sustainability initiatives and the 
disclosure of those efforts, assurance of sustainability reports is becoming more widespread. 
Assurance is an engagement whereby a practitioner expresses a conclusion designed to enhance 
the degree of confidence of the intended users about the outcome of the evaluation or the 
measurement of a subject matter against criteria (IAASB, 2011). As noted by a number of 
authors, the majority of studies focus on the antecedents of organizational communication but 
fail to examine its impact on organizational stakeholders (Kuruppu and Milne, 2010). Prior 
studies in this arena also focused for the most part on the relationship between the extent of 
disclosure and measures of corporate reputation (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Cho et al., 2012; 
Toms, 2002); however, they did not specifically consider other sustainability performance 
indicators and the potential direct and/or indirect impact of external assurance on a firm’s 
reputation for sustainability. In this study, we examine whether sustainability initiatives, 
including the external assurance of disclosure, bridge the credibility gap that arises between 
management and stakeholders and produce reputation-legitimizing effects. 
This paper makes a number of important contributions. Legitimacy theory has been 
broadly applied to argue that companies use communication strategies, including voluntary 
disclosure, as tools to gain or maintain legitimacy (e.g., Deegan, 2002). A number of studies note 
the limitations of the broad legitimacy-based approach and highlight the need for more diverse 
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perspectives and theories (Bebbington et al., 2008; O’Dwyer, 2002; Robinson et al., 2011; 
Unerman, 2008). To address these shortcomings, we extend the literature that focuses on 
sustainability initiatives in the context of reputation management (Bebbington et al., 2008; Cho 
et al., 2012; Greenwood, 2007; Greenwood and Van Buren, 2010; Robinson et al., 2011; 
Unerman, 2008); this is achieved by complementing the legitimacy perspective with insights 
from the signaling theory to explain the association between sustainability initiatives and 
reputation.  
Second, the degree to which assurance adds value to the reporting firm has been 
questioned due to inconsistencies resulting from the lack of globally accepted standards and a 
wide range of providers offering this service (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Deegan et al., 2006; Manetti 
and Becatti, 2009; Perego and Kolk, 2012). Kuruppu and Milne (2010), in an experimental case 
study designed to explore decisions of potential employees, found that assurance of sustainability 
disclosure did not impact perceptions of organizational reputation and legitimacy. Further, Jones 
and Solomon (2010) found that managers do not have a consistent view of what assurance of 
sustainability disclosure achieves. Some view it as a mechanism for dialogue with their 
stakeholders, while others see it as a managerial tool intended to verify the efficiency of internal 
processes. We examine these conflicting perspectives using a global sample of 100 companies 
representative of a variety of industries. 
Finally, a number of studies have called for a more detailed examination of sustainability 
in the context of not only external influences, such as country-level institutions, but also as a 
factor of the organizational characteristics (Aguilera-Caracuel et al., 2012; Perego and Kolk, 
2012). Salzmann, Ionescu-Somers, and Steger (2005) noted that current studies tend to focus 
solely on firms in the United States and lack comparative approaches. We add to the literature by 
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employing a multilevel approach that considers the impact of country-level, industry, and firm 
variables on the adoption of sustainability initiatives. The findings highlight that superior 
disclosure-based sustainability performance is positively associated with sustainability 
reputation. Companies with better performance were also more likely to obtain external 
assurance of their sustainability disclosure, but assurance did not have a direct association with 
reputation. Assurance appears to be a managerial tool associated with internal processes rather 
than a performance-differentiating signal to external stakeholders.  
Our paper is organized as follows. We begin with a background discussion of 
sustainability and the initiatives that companies undertake, including the reporting of 
sustainability performance and third-party assurance. We focus on the relationship between these 
efforts and firm sustainability reputation in the context of legitimacy and signaling theories. We 
next describe our exploratory empirical study and interpret the results. In the last section, we 
discuss the wider implications of the findings.  
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
Sustainability Performance, Reporting, and Reputation  
 An increasing number of companies are choosing to report and discuss their sustainability 
strategies and performance. In a survey performed by KPMG in 2008, 80 percent of the 250 
largest companies worldwide issued some type of a sustainability report compared to 
approximately 50 percent in 2005 (KPMG, 2008). According to legitimacy and reputation 
arguments, firms engage in sustainability initiatives, including sustainability reporting, to 
strengthen their legitimacy and enhance reputation (Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Patten, 2002). 
Suchman (1995) defined legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
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of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). To gain legitimacy, organizations take 
actions that are congruent with social expectations and values (Mathews, 1993). While 
legitimization of their efforts may be one of the goals that organizations pursue, their motivations 
differ. Some respond to external influences “only to receive rewards and avoid punishment” 
(Greenwood, 2001, p. 34), or at the other end of the social responsibility orientation spectrum, 
firms go beyond industry and legal expectations to promote the welfare of stakeholders 
(Greenwood, 2001). As firms recognize the opportunities and reputational risks related to 
sustainability, the challenge is to communicate their activities and not appear purely rhetorical 
(Dawkins, 2004; Gray, 2010). On the other hand, users of the reports need to differentiate 
between companies that use disclosure for “greenwashing” and manipulating public perception 
from firms that are truly committed to sustainability (de Lange et al., 2012, Higgins and Walker, 
2012; Hopwood, 2009). 
There is support for the view that firms utilize sustainability reporting as a symbolic 
action to gain legitimacy and manage public perceptions (Comyns et al., 2013). Companies can 
manipulate stakeholder perceptions through cause-related marketing and disclosure (Greenwood 
and Van Buren, 2010). Aras and Crowther (2009) observed that the amount of disclosure has 
been rapidly increasing “as firms recognized the commercial benefits of increased transparency” 
(p. 286). A number of authors examined environmental disclosure and performance and found 
that companies with a poor performance tend to provide more extensive disclosure (e.g., Cho et 
al., 2012; Cho and Patten, 2007; Patten, 2002). The extent of disclosure may actually have little 
in common with the actual sustainability performance and thus is not a good indicator of a firm’s 
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The conclusions of the studies that investigated the relationship between various 
dimensions of sustainability performance and reputation have been mixed. For example, Cho et 
al. (2012) examined the relation between environmental performance and environmental 
reputation using data compiled by Newsweek magazine. The authors anticipated but did not find 
a positive relationship between them. On the other hand, a number of studies reported that 
performance on social metrics, such as community relations, treatment of women and minorities, 
and employee relations, is positively related to firm reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Turban and Greening, 1997).  
Signaling theory offers a lens to complement the legitimacy perspective and further 
explore the relationship between performance, disclosure, and reputation. Researchers note that 
reputation is issue-specific and requires differentiation among various reputations that companies 
may have (e.g., Barnett et al., 2006; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990). Walker (2010) offers Walmart as an example of a company that is frequently questioned 
about its treatment of employees but is well regarded in terms of its financial performance. 
Recognizing the multidimensional nature of reputation, in this study we specifically focus on the 
noneconomic components of sustainability. Although firms engage in sustainability activities to 
strengthen their legitimacy and enhance reputation, the nature of disclosure will vary based on 
their performance.  
Signaling theory focuses on the sender of the signal (the firm in this case), the signal, and 
the receivers (stakeholders). Firms have information that others are not aware of and use 
signaling to reduce information asymmetry (Spence, 1974). As noted by Hahn and Lülfs (2014), 
“the sustainability performance of a company can be regarded as asymmetric information 
because it is difficult for parties outside the company to gain credible information on 
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sustainability aspects”. Proactively reporting their sustainability-related activities can reduce 
information asymmetry.  
According to the theory, effective signals are observable and costly to replicate (see 
review by Connelly et al., 2011b). For example, ISO14000 certification or the use of 
environmentally friendly materials in production are costly but demonstrate commitment to 
sustainability (Connelly et al., 2011a; Connelly et al., 2011b; Shrivastava, 1995). A number of 
studies have found support for this hypothesis based on the relationship between environmental 
performance outcomes and disclosure. Specifically, firms with better environmental performance 
were found to provide better quality information than poor performers (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2003; 
Mallin et al., 2013). Similarly, Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari (2008) found a positive 
association between environmental performance and the level of discretionary disclosures and 
concluded that better performers were more forthcoming. Further, authors noted that general 
disclosure of environmental policy and commitment to the environment can be genuine if 
substantiated but can also be easily replicated and deceiving (Clarkson et al., 2008). The signal 
needs to be credible, as false signals, once revealed, are no longer effective (Watson et al., 2002). 
Thus, superior performers pursue and report initiatives that would be difficult for poor 
environmental performers to mimic (Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2011).  
Signaling theory recognizes the importance of stakeholders who are exposed to the firm 
signals, as the extent of the signal effectiveness depends on whether receivers are receptive to the 
signal (Janney and Folta, 2006). With companies reporting their activities more specifically, 
external stakeholders are more likely to be familiar with these efforts and recognize substantive 
commitment to sustainability. Thus, superior performance is expected to enhance a firm’s 
reputation for sustainability. We state this hypothesis as follows:  
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H1: Sustainability reputation is positively associated with performance as reflected in the 
sustainability disclosure.  
 
 
Sustainability Performance and Assurance: Congruence Signaling 
There is an ongoing debate about the role of external assurance within an organization’s 
sustainability strategy. Third-party assurance of sustainability reports has become a more 
common element of sustainability reporting (e.g., Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012; Perego and 
Kolk, 2012). Firms have turned increasingly to third parties for sustainability assurance. 
KPMG’s 2008 survey reported that 40 percent of sustainability reports published by the 250 
largest companies contained formal third-party assurance compared to 30 percent in 2005 
(KPMG, 2008).  
Although assurance of sustainability disclosure is becoming more widespread, the degree 
to which external stakeholders find it important and whether assurance adds value to the 
reporting firm has been questioned due to inconsistencies resulting from the lack of globally 
accepted standards and a wide range of providers offering this service (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; 
Deegan et al., 2006; Manetti and Becatti, 2009; Perego and Kolk, 2012). For example, the two 
most frequently used international standards are International Standards for Assurance 
Engagement (ISAE) 3000 and corporate responsibility assurance standard AA1000AS. 
ISAE3000 is a principles-based standard that can be applied to a wide range of assurance 
engagements and was written for professional accountants in public practice. The code of 
conduct specified in the standard is familiar to accountants but may not be customary for other 
providers of sustainability assurance. Another sustainability assurance standard, AA1000AS, is 
issued by the British nonprofit organization AccountAbility. It requires assurance providers to 
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evaluate not only data reliability but also how companies manage sustainability (AccountAbility, 
2008). The standard can be applied by any of the providers of sustainability assurance.  
 Currently, there are no specific qualifications for sustainability assurance providers. The 
arena is increasingly dominated by the major accounting firms. According to KPMG’s 2008 
survey, the majority of global 250 companies relied on these firms for assurance (KPMG, 2008). 
Assurance is also offered by technical experts and specialist assurance providers. The variability 
in the standards and providers contributes to variation in the level of assurance, types of 
verification, reporting criteria, and format of the statements.  
According to the signaling theory, companies deliberately communicate information in 
an effort to convey positive organizational attributes (Connelly et al., 2011a). For example, 
Kirmani and Rao (2000) applied signaling theory to examine how firms communicate the 
unobservable quality of their products. They distinguished between firms with low-quality and 
high-quality products and argued that only firms with high-quality products were motivated to 
signal their true quality. Watson, Shrives, and Marston (2002) found that better-performing firms 
were more likely to distinguish themselves through voluntary disclosure of ratios in corporate 
annual reports. Park and Brorson (2005), in a study of Swedish companies, found firms obtained 
assurance to maintain the frontrunner position in sustainability management. Jones and Solomon 
(2010) emphasize that managers do not have a consistent rationale for obtaining external 
assurance of sustainability reports. Some view it as a mechanism for dialogue with stakeholders, 
while others see it as a managerial tool intended to verify internal processes. 
From the managerial process perspective, obtaining assurance contributes to the 
congruence between management’s rhetoric and organizational action. One of the aspects of the 
internal focus on sustainability relates to the communication of information to support these 
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initiatives (Burritt and Schaltegger, 2010). Assurance becomes an informational signal that 
provides insight into the actions of managers (Libby et al., 2004) and is perceived as an integral 
part of sustainability reporting for organizations aiming to present externally verified information 
(Martinov-Bennie et al., 2012). We expect that third-party assurance of sustainability reports 
becomes a part of the sustainability process and is used by firms to signal congruence between 
their commitment to sustainability and actions; we therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
H2: Third-party assurance is positively associated with performance as reflected in the 
sustainability disclosure. 
 
Assurance and Sustainability Reputation: External Signaling  
Those making a business case for assurance anticipate that it will enhance public 
perception of firm activities. Several academic studies suggest that assurance can enhance the 
credibility of the reported information and legitimize sustainability efforts (Kolk and Perego, 
2010; Simnett et al., 2009). Further, it has been argued that assurance is beneficial to corporate 
reputation, but that premise has not been sufficiently examined, and the empirical results have 
not been consistent (Park and Brorson, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009). Kuruppu and Milne (2010), 
in an experimental case study designed to explore the decisions of potential employees, found 
that assurance of sustainability disclosure did not impact perceptions of organizational reputation 
and legitimacy. On the other hand, Hodge, Subramaniam, and Stewart (2008) found that having 
assurance improved report users’ perceptions of the reliability of environmental and social 
information.  
From the external signaling perspective, sustainability efforts are communicated to 
stakeholders to attract investment and gain a more favorable reputation. Receivers of information 
go through the process of translating signals into perceived meaning (Connelly et al., 2011a). 
Assurance is one of the initiatives undertaken that can establish legitimacy with external 
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stakeholders and influence reputation (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Thus, we expect third-party 
assurance to have a positive impact on companies’ sustainability reputations and propose the 
following hypothesis:  
H3: Sustainability reputation is positively associated with having third-party assurance of 
sustainability disclosure.  
 
Figure 1 presents the hypothesized relationships between disclosure-based sustainability 
performance, firm’s sustainability reputation, and third-party assurance. 
---------- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ---------- 
Methodology 
Sample  
 
 The sample consists of 100 companies for which sustainability efforts were analyzed and 
featured in the 2011 Sustainability Leadership report produced as a result of the cooperation 
between Brandlogic and CRD Analytics. To be included in the sample, companies had to (1) be a 
major global brand according to the 2011 Brand Finance Global 500 ranking of brand value, (2) 
have a high level of familiarity in China, Germany, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
U.S. (the countries used in the survey), and (3) be a public company that reports financial and 
sustainability information. According to the report, these companies collectively represent “20 
percent of total global market capitalization and 40 percent of the value of the Standard & Poor's 
500 index” (Brandlogic, 2011). The following sectors were represented: Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Industrials, Information Technology, 
Materials, Healthcare, and Telecommunication Services. Variable measures are described next 
and summarized in Table 1.  
---------- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---------- 
 
Sustainability Reputation  
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 To measure sustainability reputation, we use the Sustainability Perception Score (SPS) 
from the 2011 Sustainability Leadership report discussed above. The data for the SPS were 
collected in 2011 for the Corporate Sustainability Brand Perception Survey by TNS, an 
established international research firm.1 The survey asked participants a series of questions 
related to their perceptions of companies’ performance regarding environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) factors, and their responses were used to derive the SPS. Each company was 
rated by a total of 2,400 participants from China, Germany, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the U.S. (400 from each country). The survey focused on external stakeholders by surveying 
investment professionals, purchasing professionals and graduating university students (800 from 
each category). Reputation scores for the sample companies ranged from 31.9 to 58.8, with a 
mean (median) of 47.17 (47.1). The top three rated companies were ABB, Walt Disney, and 
Abbott Labs. 
 
Disclosure-based Sustainability Performance  
 
 To measure the level of sustainability performance as conveyed by disclosure, we used 
the Sustainability Reality Score (SRS). The score was developed by CRD Analytics, the leading 
provider of sustainability investment analytics, and is based on direct measures of environmental, 
social and governance performance from the firms’ 2009 sustainability reports. CRD Analytics 
used their proprietary SmartViewTM-360 platform and database to measure the following 
components: environmental (waste, energy, water, emissions, and risk mitigation), social 
(product responsibility, community, human rights, diversity and opportunity, and employment 
quality), and governance (board functions, board structure, compensation, vision and strategy, 
and shareholder rights). They utilized a total of 175 quantitative and qualitative performance 
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metrics with the majority based on GRI’s indicators (Brandlogic, 2011). According to the report, 
the SPS and the SRS raw scores were converted to 0-100 indices to allow for direct comparisons. 
The SRS scores for the sample companies range from 1.3 to 71.2, with a mean (median) of 42.36 
(45.65). Based on the evaluation of disclosure, the top three performers were Merck, IBM, and 
Nokia. 
 
Assurance  
 
 We obtained data on whether firms obtained external assurance of their sustainability 
reports from Corporate Register, an online directory of sustainability reports, or, if not available, 
from the company website. We define our assurance variable as equal to 1 if the company’s 
2009 sustainability report is assured by a third party and 0 if it is not. Forty companies in our 
sample had their sustainability reports assured.  
 
Control Variables  
 The prior research documents that a number of industry-specific and country-specific 
factors may influence the firm assurance decision and sustainability reputation. Both Simnett, 
Vanstraelen, Chua (2009) and Kolk and Perego (2010) found that the structure of the legal 
system and industry characteristics are significant determinants of assurance. Companies based 
in a more stakeholder-oriented, code-law countries were more likely to obtain assurance of 
disclosure than companies based in a more shareholder-orientated, common-law countries 
(Simnet et al., 2009). In common-law countries, firms tend to focus on shareholders, while in 
code-law countries, the responsibility of firms extends to a broader group of stakeholders 
including banks, labor unions and business associations. Similar to prior studies, we use the code 
law/common law differentiation as a proxy for stakeholder/shareholder orientation. Based on the 
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classification in Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua (2009), we create a dummy variable called 
stakeholder that assumes a value of 1 if a company is domiciled in a code-law country and 0 if it 
is domiciled in a common-law country. In our sample, 39 companies are domiciled in a code-law 
country. The following countries in our sample represent code-law countries: Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea and Switzerland. Common-law countries 
are: Australia, Canada, India, the United Kingdom and the United States. This differentiation is 
also included as a control variable in the analysis of sustainability reputation, as it may influence 
how a firm’s sustainability efforts are perceived (Smith et al., 2005). Table 2 summarizes the 
number of firms by country. 
---------- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---------- 
 
 Companies in certain industries have a larger environmental footprint that may impact 
their sustainability reputation and the decision to obtain external assurance (Simnett et al., 2009). 
To account for industry effects, we create an industry dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm 
operates in an environmentally sensitive industry based on its North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS). The classification is based on the 2009 list by the U.S. Census 
Bureau that specifies the NAICS codes associated with environmentally sensitive industries. In 
addition, following Simnett et al. (2009), who find that large companies are significantly more 
likely to have their sustainability reports assured compared to small companies, we include the 
log of 2009 sales obtained from Compustat to account for firm size. Table 3 displays the 
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all variables. Significant correlations exist 
between the measures for sustainability performance, sustainability reputation, firm size, and 
assurance. 
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---------- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ---------- 
 
Results 
 
 With all variables in the study observed and measured, we use covariance-based 
structural equation (SEM) path analysis to estimate direct and indirect effects of the variables. 
The inspection of the data and the univariate tests of normality show a rejection (at the 5% level) 
of the null hypothesis of univariate normality for two variables: sustainability performance (SRS) 
and size (log of sales). Mardia’s test for multivariate skewness, Mardia’s test for multivariate 
kurtosis and Doornik–Hansen test based on the skewness and kurtosis, all reject the null 
hypothesis of multivariate normality, an assumption needed for structural equation modeling. As 
an aid to nonnormal data, we bootstrapped the standard errors (Nevitt and Hancock, 2001). The 
results of the SEM analysis testing our hypotheses are displayed in Figure 2. We estimated the 
hypothesized paths using the sem command in Stata12.  
---------- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ---------- 
 
As recommended by Schumacker and Lomax (2004), we examined several goodness-of-
fit statistics calculated by Stata to assess whether our path model has an acceptable fit. The Chi-
square statistics of 0.91 is statistically insignificant, with p-value of 0.34, indicating that our path 
model is a close fit for the sample. Although root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
is commonly used, Kenny, Kaniskan, and McCoach (2014) do not recommend utilizing RMSEA 
as a measure of the goodness of fit for smaller samples. Instead, we focus on the probability of 
the close fit as suggested by Kenny (2015). This is a one-sided test of the null hypothesis that the 
RMSEA = 0.05 which represents a close-fitting model against the alternative hypothesis that the 
RMSEA is greater than 0.05. We fail to reject the null hypothesis with (p = 0.40) indicating a 
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close fit of the model. The comparative fit index (CFI) is 1.00 which is above the recommended 
threshold of 0.95, indicating a good fit. Thus, the tested model has an acceptable fit and is 
reasonably consistent with the data. 
 The first hypothesis examines whether there is a positive association between the firm 
sustainability performance and sustainability reputation. As anticipated, we find the path from 
sustainability performance to the perception of the firm sustainability reputation to be positive 
and statistically significant (p < .01). This indicates that performance is positively associated 
with sustainability reputation, and thus, H1 is supported.  
 Our second hypothesis examines the association between sustainability performance and 
the likelihood of obtaining third-party assurance. We hypothesize that firms will be more likely 
to obtain assurance to signal congruence between their commitment to sustainability and their 
actions. We find the path from disclosure-based sustainability performance to assurance is 
positive and statistically significant (p < .01). This supports H2 and suggests that firms may use 
assurance as a signal to convey their commitment to sustainability.  
 The third hypothesis posits a positive association between third-party assurance of firm 
sustainability reports and their reputation for sustainability. The path from assurance to the 
sustainability perception score is negative, albeit statistically insignificant, indicating that having 
its sustainability report assured does not affect sustainability reputation. Thus, H3 is not 
supported. Our results suggest that although better-performing firms appear to use assurance to 
signal their performance, external stakeholders do not incorporate that signal into their 
evaluation of firm sustainability reputations. Overall, the results confirm that disclosed 
sustainability performance is positively associated with sustainability reputation. On the other 
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hand, while better-performing firms were more likely to obtain third-party assurance, that signal 
was not reflected in the firm’s sustainability reputation. 
 The model also includes controls for whether a firm is domiciled in a code-law country 
(stakeholder) and whether it operates in an environmentally sensitive industry (industry). The 
path from the stakeholder control variable to assurance decision is positive and statistically 
significant (p < .01), while the path from the stakeholder control variable to the firm 
sustainability reputation is not statistically significant. Thus, the assurance decision is positively 
associated with whether a firm is located in a stakeholder-focused country, but that does not 
directly impact reputation. The path from membership in the environmentally sensitive industry 
to the firm sustainability reputation is not statistically significant. Thus, belonging to an 
environmentally sensitive industry does not directly impact the overall sustainability reputation. 
Similarly, we do not find that firm size effects the assurance decision. One potential explanation 
is the lack of variation in the size of the firms in the sample, as all firms are large and well 
established. 
 
Supplemental Analysis 
 
Given the lack of multivariate normality, we also estimated the model using a form of 
weighted least squares. This was done in Stata utilizing the asymptotic distribution free method 
under the sem command which does not require the assumption of multivariate normality. The 
global fit of our model is acceptable. The Chi-square statistics of 1.26 is statistically 
insignificant, with a p-value of 0.26. The RMSEA is 0.05 (p-close = 0.32), and the CFI is 0.99. 
Although the magnitude of the coefficients on the estimated paths are somewhat different, the 
same paths are still statistically significant and therefore conclusions do not change. 
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Since the industry dummy was not statistically significant, we furthered examined the 
relationship between specific industries and sustainability reputation. We focused on the 
Manufacturing (NAICS 31-33), Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction and Production 
(NAICS 21 and 324), and Finance and Insurance (NAICS 52) industries that Simnett et al. 
(2009) identified to have a larger environmental and social footprint. The regression model was 
estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator and the results are presented in Table 
4. Standard errors have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The model has a reasonable fit with 
R2of 0.267 and the Shapiro-Wilk test (p = .53) does not reject the hypothesis that the residuals 
are normally distributed. We find membership in the oil and gas industry is negatively associated 
with reputation. We also find a statistically significant association between the finance and 
insurance industry and the sustainability reputation. As the data were collected at approximately 
the same time as the financial crisis, the findings highlight that these firms may be perceived in a 
negative light for their role in the crisis. 
---------- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ---------- 
Discussion and Implications 
 
 With the current lack of evidence regarding responses of the external stakeholders to 
sustainability initiatives other than their investment decisions, we explore other strategic 
outcomes. More specifically, we focus on the relationships between sustainability performance, 
assurance of disclosure, and reputation for sustainability. By combining the insights from the 
signaling theory with the legitimacy perspective, we are better able to explain the association 
between sustainability initiatives and reputation. Our exploratory data indicate that actual 
disclosed performance has a positive association with the reputation for sustainability. The 
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nature of the signal is important as it needs to be difficult to mimic and observable to be 
effective. Thus, while the amount of disclosure is easy to inflate, the actual performance is more 
difficult to replicate.  
Companies with better performance were also more likely to obtain external assurance of 
their sustainability disclosure, but assurance did not have a direct association with reputation. 
Third-party assurance is expected to play a prominent role in ensuring accountability for 
sustainability performance. To obtain third-party assurance, firms have to invest in the reporting 
infrastructure that can be evaluated. This is a significant investment that companies make to 
enhance the credibility of information (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Simnett et al., 2009). 
Assurance appears to be a managerial tool associated with the congruence of internal processes 
rather than a performance-differentiating signal to external stakeholders. As supported by the 
internal congruence argument, firms may be obtaining assurance to signal their commitment to 
internal audience.  
Our findings indicate that external assurance did not have a positive association with 
reputation for sustainability. The results are consistent with Kuruppu and Milne (2010), who 
examined but did not find support for the premise that assurance impacts the credibility of 
information for potential employees. As highlighted by Perego and Kolk (2012), a number of 
structural deficiencies potentially “undermine the credibility of such novel verification 
mechanisms” (p. 184). Lack of consistent standards and provider differences make it difficult for 
nonspecialists to interpret what assurance statements mean in terms of sustainability performance 
(e.g., Manetti and Becatti, 2009; Perego and Kolk, 2012). There are also concerns that significant 
management control of the assurance scope and the commercial interests of management and/or 
assurance providers may jeopardize the independence of assurors and further undermine the 
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legitimacy of the process (Ball et al., 2000; Deegan et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2011). Further, 
there is insufficient familiarity with third-party assurance on the part of the external users. 
Signaling theory does note that for the signal to be effective, the receiver needs to be aware of 
what to look for (Connelly et al., 2011a). Thus, there is a need to focus on external stakeholders, 
as they may not fully understand the process and implications of third-party assurance. 
As highlighted by Perego and Kolk (2012), it is necessary to consider country-level and 
firm-level factors as drivers of sustainability assurance and, more broadly, other sustainability 
efforts. We included macro-level legal orientation and found that firms from code-law countries 
were more likely to obtain assurance, supporting the institutional perspective that recognizes the 
role of country-level institutions in shaping sustainability efforts. Industry factors were also 
important in how the firm reputation for sustainability was perceived. Studies that focus on 
environmental disclosure and performance tend to examine firms from environmentally sensitive 
industries. The broader view indicates that other industries, as was the case for the financial 
companies in our study, are also impacted.  
The results of the study should be interpreted in light of the following limitations. The 
survey data were obtained from published reports, and the data collection process could not be 
verified. We focused on large multinational companies domiciled in developed countries, thus 
the observed relationships may not hold for other types of firms. Due to the limited number of 
firms in our sample that had their sustainability reports assured, we examined the general signal 
of whether the firm obtained third-party assurance. To expand upon this approach, future studies 
could focus on whether a specific type of assurance and the details contained in assurance 
statements play a role in the firm sustainability reputation.  
Reputation: Sustainability Performance and Assurance 
 
22 
 
The findings highlight an additional important topic that requires greater attention from 
researchers: specifically, how companies manage sustainability given that it encompasses 
distinct components. For example, because social, environmental, governance, and economic 
dimensions are a part of the sustainability efforts, do certain dimensions have a greater impact on 
the sustainability reputation? Is there a substitution effect whereby poor performance in certain 
dimensions is compensated for by other components? Findings by Cho and coauthors (2012) 
support this possibility. The authors found that companies with a poor environmental 
performance were still likely to be a part of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), which 
ranks companies based on social, economic, and environmental indicators.  
Notwithstanding the limitations noted, this study has important implications for the 
literature on disclosed sustainability performance, assurance practices and reputation. The 
disclosure of substantiated claims of sustainability efforts is a signal that companies can use to 
convey their performance. Further, third-party assurance continues to be an evolving verification 
mechanism that firms use to convey internal congruence but may not be well understood by 
external stakeholders. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
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Figure 2: Path Analysis of Hypothesized Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Variable measures are described in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Definition and source 
Sustainability 
Perception Score 
(SPS) 
Score based on answers to a series of questions related to 
participant perceptions of company performance on 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors (2011 
Brandlogic Sustainability Leadership Report) 
  
Sustainability Reality 
Score (SRS) 
Score based on the direct measures of environmental, social 
and governance performance as presented in the sustainability 
report (2011 Brandlogic Sustainability Leadership Report) 
  
Assurance 1 if a company’s sustainability report is assured by the third 
party (Corporate Register, www.corporateregister.com) 
  
Stakeholder 1 if a company is domiciled in a code-law country; 0 otherwise 
  
Industry 
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
Oil & Gas 
 
 
Finance & Insurance 
(FinIns) 
 
Size 
1 if a company operates in an environmentally sensitive 
industry as indicated by the NAICS (U.S. Census Bureau) 
 
1 if a company is a part of NAICS 31-33 (excluding NAICS 
324) 
 
1 if a company is a part of NAICS 21 and NAICS 324 
 
 
1 if a company is a part of NAICS 52 
 
 
Log of 2009 sales (Compustat) 
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Table 2: Number of Firms by Country 
 
Country Number of firms 
Code Law 
  
Denmark 1 
Finland 1 
France 5 
Germany 12 
Japan 10 
The Netherlands 4 
South Korea 1 
Switzerland 5 
  39 
Common Law 
  
Australia 1 
Canada 1 
India 1 
The United Kingdom 8 
The United States 50 
  61 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Min Max 
SPS 47.17 47.10 31.90 58.80 
SRS 
Size 
42.37 
10.59 
45.65 
10.55 
1.30 
5.88 
71.20 
12.91 
Assurance 40a    
Stakeholder 39a    
Industry 
Manufacturing 
OilGas 
FinIns 
65a 
55a 
6a 
11a 
   
a
 indicates the number of observations in the sample that belong to the classification. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Variable SRS Assurance Stakeholder Industry SPS 
SRS 1     
Assurance .25** 1    
Stakeholder      .01 .39*** 1   
Industry      .08     .13 .16 1  
SPS .22**    -.07 .03 .10  
Size      .27***     .11        .14       -.08 -.03 
 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table 4: Regression Results 
 
Variable SPS 
Assurance -1.840 
(1.122) 
SRS 0.095*** 
(0.031) 
Manufacturing -0.244 
(1.129) 
FinIns -6.534*** 
(1.713) 
OilGas 
 
-6.226*** 
(2.185) 
Stakeholder 0.898 
(1.089) 
  
R squared 0.267 
N 100 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 A full description of the survey and methodology is available at 
http://www.brandlogic.com/perspectives/sustainability.html 
 
 
 
 
